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SCALIA'S RAICH CONCURRENCE: A
SIGNIFICANT DEPARTURE FROM
ORIGINALIST INTERPRETATION?
I. INTRODUCTION
In the recent case of Gonzales v. Raich,' the Supreme Court upheld
the Controlled Substances Act ("CSA") through which Congress
prohibited the medicinal use of marijuana, even if such use was limited
to intrastate, noncommercial use.2 The CSA is a comprehensive set of
federal regulations that makes it unlawful "to manufacture, distribute,
or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or
dispense a controlled substance."3  In support of its decision, the
majority relied4 upon a broad interpretation of the Commerce Clause5
that is congruent with the vast majority of nearly seventy years of
Commerce Clause jurisprudence,6 with the exception of the more recent
decisions of United States v. Morrison7 and United States v. Lopez.8
Additionally, the Court emphasized the similarities between Congress's
regulation of home-grown marijuana under the facts of Raich, and its
regulation of home-grown wheat 9 in Wickard v. Filburn,0 a 1942
decision in which the Court upheld a federal statute regulating wheat
1. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
2. Id. at 26; see also id. at 21-22 (discussing appellant's arguments).
3. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2000).
4. Raich, 545 U.S. at 15-18.
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
6. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610 (2000) (acknowledging that there has
been a clear "pattern of analysis" regarding cases that address Congress's authority to
regulate activities that "substantially affect[] interstate commerce"). See generally Eric R.
Claeys, Raich and Judicial Conservatism at the Close of the Rehnquist Court, 9 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 791 (2005) (acknowledging that Lopez and Morrison signaled a "New
Federalism" in Commerce Clause cases of the Rehnquist Court).
7. 529 U.S. 598 (striking down a provision of the Violence Against Women Act, which
provided a federal remedy for victims of gender-motivated crimes because Congress lacked
authority to enact such a provision even under an expansive view of Commerce Clause power
due to the "noneconomic" nature of the activity being regulated).
8. 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995) (holding that Congress had exceeded its constitutional
authority by enacting the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 under the Commerce Clause
because determining that possession of a gun within a school zone affected interstate
commerce required accepting a chain of inferences).
9. Raich, 545 U.S. at 18-19.
10. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
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production as a valid exercise of Congress's power pursuant to the
Commerce Clause.1
Justice Antonin Scalia filed a concurring opinion in Raich,
concluding that Congress had the authority to regulate the medicinal use
of marijuana, even if it encompassed wholly intrastate activity, through a
differing constitutional interpretation. 2 His position was that according
to the Necessary and Proper Clause, 3 Congress has the power to
effectuate the laws that it has enacted through constitutionally
enumerated powers by passing further laws, even if those laws are not
themselves derived from enumerated constitutional authority.14
Scalia's concurrence appears to mark a departure from his self-
described "originalist" approach to constitutional interpretation" and
his hostility toward the idea of an "evolving" Constitution. 6  This
departure appears contrary to Scalia's well-known originalist approach
to constitutional interpretation."
This Note addresses the contrast between the approach of Scalia's
Raich concurrence and his originalist constitutional interpretation in
other areas of the law. Part II provides an overview of Scalia's Raich
concurrence and his reliance on the Necessary and Proper Clause.1
8
Part III considers Scalia's Commerce Clause jurisprudence by assessing
recent cases interpreting Congress's commerce power. Part IV
contemplates Scalia's originalist approach in other areas of the law,
including equal protection, due process, and cruel and unusual
punishment jurisprudence. Finally, Part V focuses on whether Scalia's
11. Id. at 127-29.
12. 545 U.S. at 35 (Scalia, J., concurring).
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 ("[Congress has the power t]o make all Laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any
Department or Officer thereof.").
14. Raich, 545 U.S. at 35 (Scalia, J., concurring).
15. Justice Antonin Scalia, Constitutional Interpretation the Old Fashioned Way,
Remarks at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (Mar. 14, 2005), available
at www.cif.org/htdocs/legal-issues/legal-updates/us-supreme-court/scalia-constitutional-
speech.htm.
16. See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 861-62
(1989).
17. See Randy E. Barnett, Scalia's Infidelity: A Critique of "Faint-Hearted" Originalism,
75 U. CIN. L. REV. 7, 13-14 (2006) (claiming that Scalia follows originalism only when it will
produce the outcome he desires). But see Claeys, supra note 6, at 794-95 (discussing that
Scalia has generally ascribed to what is described as a "judicial minimalist" approach, which
may allow for a determination that Scalia has remained consistent in his interpretations).
18. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 33-42 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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Raich concurrence is a significant departure from his originalist judicial
philosophy and, if so, what that departure implies regarding Scalia's
position in future Supreme Court cases involving the Commerce Clause.
II. JUSTICE SCALIA'S COMMERCE CLAUSE ANALYSIS AND HIS
RELIANCE UPON THE NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE
Scalia's Raich concurrence states that Congress has the authority to
regulate the intrastate possession and use of marijuana for medicinal
purposes, but he does not justify this exercise of authority through the
same means as the majority opinion. 9 Specifically, Scalia finds that
Congress's power cannot be found in the Commerce Clause alone, but
rather is derived from the convergence of the Commerce Clause and the
Necessary and Proper Clause.2"
In cases addressing the Commerce Clause, the Supreme Court has
continually reiterated that there are three categories under which
Congress can regulate commerce: (1) the channels of interstate
commerce, (2) the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, and (3)
local activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.23  Scalia
concluded in his Raich concurrence that this third category does not fit
within Congress's power under the Commerce Clause, but rather
Congress must derive its power in this area from another constitutional
provision.24
Scalia in his own words answered by "resort[ing] to the last, best
hope of those who defend ultra vires congressional action, the Necessary
and Proper Clause, 25 which allows Congress to enact laws that carry out
any of its enumerated powers." Furthermore, Scalia found that if
19. Id. at 33.
20. Id. at 34. The idea that it is through the Necessary and Proper Clause that Congress
has obtained its power in the more recent Commerce Clause cases has been acknowledged by
Justices on the Court in recent decades. See, e.g., id.; Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 585-86 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
21. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 256 (1964);
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 114 (1941).
22. See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150, 156-57 (1971); Houston E. & W.
Tex. Ry. Co., 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
23. See, e.g., Raich, 545 U.S. at 17; United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610 (2000);
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 (1995).
24. 545 U.S. at 34 (Scalia, J., concurring).
25. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923 (1997) (emphasis added); see Raich, 545
U.S. at 34-35 (Scalia, J., concurring).
26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. The Necessary and Proper Clause allows Congress to
effectuate the laws that it has enacted under other enumerated constitutional powers through
20071 1045
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Congress has such power through the Necessary and Proper Clause, this
power is not limited to laws regulating intrastate commerce or areas that
"substantially affect interstate commerce.",17 Scalia's interpretation of
the Necessary and Proper Clause in this context conveys an even
broader grant of congressional power than has been offered in previous
Commerce Clause cases.
Specifically, Scalia noted two instances in which Congress has the
power to regulate intrastate activities (whether these activities are
economic or not): (1) when Congress is facilitating interstate commerce
by eliminating obstructions to the market or (2) when Congress is
restricting commerce by eliminating possible stimulants to the market.28
Here, Congress was eliminating an entire market-the market for
marijuana. Therefore, in Scalia's view, Congress has the power to
regulate all activities that might frustrate Congress's attempts to
eliminate this market.29 Scalia also focused on the connection between
the regulation of the marijuana market and the broad regulatory scheme
governing the market for all controlled substances, legal and illegal.3"
The only limitation Scalia places on this "necessary and proper"
power is that the regulation be "reasonably adapted" to a legitimate end
under Commerce Clause power.3 The application of this standard
indicates a departure from Scalia's generally unfavorable view of
malleable standards of interpretation that leave open the possibility that
individual Justices will rely upon their personal preferences.
3 2
Scalia explains the extent of his broad interpretation of Necessary
and Proper Clause power, finding that when Congress encroaches upon
another constitutional principle, such as state sovereignty, the law is not
an appropriate exercise of Congress's power.33 Yet, Scalia quickly
reasonable means. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 315, 413-14 (1819). This Clause has been
interpreted broadly such that "necessary" and "proper" have been read similarly rather than
applying a general definition of "necessary," which would require the law to be essential.
Therefore, under this interpretation, Congress can enact laws that are rationally related to
laws enacted under its enumerated powers. Id.
27. Raich, 545 U.S. at 34-35 (Scalia, J., concurring).
28. Id. at 35.
29. Id. at 40.
30. Id. at 40-41.
31. Id. at 37.
32. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW 39-40 (1997). See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 31-32 (2003) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (declining to apply a "proportionality" test to the interpretation of the Eighth
Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment because the Eighth Amendment only
prohibits certain "modes" of punishment).
33. Raich, 545 U.S. at 39 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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dismisses the possibility that the congressional authority exercised in
this case violates state sovereignty by explaining that state sovereignty
cannot be found simply by asserting that an area of law has traditionally
been left to state regulation.' Scalia further undercuts state sovereignty
by suggesting that Congress need not trust states to effectively enforce
their own regulations." However, Scalia applied this limitation on
Congress's Commerce Clause power when he drafted the majority
opinion in Printz v. United States,36 finding that when a law enacted to
carry out Commerce Clause power violates principles of state
sovereignty as established in the Tenth Amendment,37 such a law is not
38proper.
Scalia's arguments for congressional power in his Raich concurrence
do not conform to the principles of constitutional interpretation he has
expounded in other decisions. First, his emphasis on an extremely
broad interpretation of congressional power, especially in the
Commerce Clause context, does not comport with his emphasis on
reading the Constitution as it was meant when enacted.3 9 Certainly, the
Framers did not understand the Commerce Clause power to include
congressional authority to regulate wholly intrastate non-economic
activities.'4
Second, Scalia's Raich" concurrence further strays from the idea
first emphasized by Justice Marshall that Congress's powers are
"defined, and limited.,1 2 Scalia's reliance upon the flexible standard of
"'reasonably adapted' . . . to a legitimate end, 43 is also in contravention
to his interpretive philosophy. Although Scalia has sometimes
acquiesced to the use of such a malleable rule when adhering to stare
decisis," he has also indicated his frustration with this type of standard
34. Id. at 41.
35. See id.
36. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
37. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
38. Printz, 521 U.S. at 923-24.
39. Scalia, supra note 16, at 852.
40. See, e.g., Raich, 545 U.S. at 58-59 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (explaining the historical
context of the Commerce Clause power); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 596 (1995)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (noting that no cases prior to the New Deal interpreted the
Commerce Clause so broadly).
41. 545 U.S. at 33 (Scalia, J., concurring).
42. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
43. Raich, 545 U.S. at 37 (Scalia, J., concurring).
44. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 608-10 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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even while applying it himself.4 1 In his Raich concurrence, Scalia shows
no such frustration. Rather, he embraces the standard and, notably, was
the only Justice to apply it with full force. 6
III. OVERVIEW OF RECENT COMMERCE CLAUSE CASES AND JUSTICE
SCALIA'S POSITIONS IN THOSE DECISIONS
Before the decision in Gonzales v. Raich,47 scholars contemplated
that a new Commerce Clause philosophy may be emerging in the
Supreme Court, indicating a more restrictive view of congressional
power and a move back toward the Lochner era interpretation.48 Two
recent decisions seemed to upset the Court's longstanding and
increasingly expansive interpretation of Congress's Commerce Clause
power, exemplified by such cases as NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp.' 9 and Wickard v. Filburn.5 ° These cases were United States v.
Lopez"1 and United States v. Morrison;52 in both cases, the majority
found that Congress had exceeded its authority under the Commerce
Clause. Prior to Lopez and Morrison, the Supreme Court had not found
such a congressional violation of Commerce Clause authority in the
nearly seventy preceding years of Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
45. Id. at 608 (noting that in determining whether capital punishment as used for minors
is cruel and unusual punishment the Court considers, "in accordance with [its] modern
(though in [his] view mistaken) jurisprudence, whether there is a 'national consensus'); see
also Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 556 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I have generally
rejected tests based on such malleable standards as 'proportionality,' because they have a way
of turning into vehicles for the implementation of individual judges' policy preferences.").
46. The majority opinion explained the standard of review it was applying as whether
"Congress had a rational basis for concluding" that respondents' activities would substantially
affect interstate commerce. Raich, 545 U.S. at 19. While both analyses are essentially
applying differing interpretations of the rational basis test, it is Scalia's concurrence that
actually reiterates the "appropriateness standard." For the proposition that Scalia was the
only Justice on the Supreme Court to correctly decide Raich, see generally The Supreme
Court, 2004 Term-Leading Cases, 119 HARv. L. REV. 169 (2005) (determining that the
majority opinion failed to reconcile Lopez and Morrison with the return to broader
application of the Commerce Clause through the "substantial effects" test used in Raich).
47. 545 U.S. 1.
48. See, e.g., George P. Ferro, Note, Affecting Commerce: Post Lopez Review of the
Hobbs Act, 66 ALB. L. REV. 1197 (2003); see also Claeys, supra note 6.
49. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
50. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
51. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
52. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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A. United States v. Lopez
In Lopez, 3 a high school student challenged the Gun-Free School
Zones Act of 1990, which made it a federal offense for anyone to
possess a firearm within a school zone. 4 The majority opinion, written
by Chief Justice Rehnquist, found that Congress did not have the power
under the Commerce Clause to enact such a statute because the
possession of a firearm was not "connected in any way to interstate
commerce."55 The Court went on to determine that, even with a broad
interpretation of Commerce Clause power, there are limits on
Congress's authority.16 Ultimately, the majority concluded that to find
that the possession of a firearm within a school zone "sufficiently
affected interstate commerce" required too many intermediary
inferences to justify such regulation,57 and that this provision was
primarily a criminal statute-an area of law traditionally left to state
regulation under the "police power.
58
Furthermore, the Court alluded to the notion that interpreting the
Commerce Clause power too broadly could lead to valid congressional
regulation of nearly all aspects of law, including family law. 9 Scalia
joined the majority in this case and declined to provide a concurring
opinion,' leading one to conclude that he agreed with the majority's
analysis of the Commerce Clause power without reference to the
Necessary and Proper Clause.61
53. 514 U.S. 549.
54. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (1988).
55. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
56. Id. at 557.
57. Id. at 567-68.
58. See id. at 567.
59. Id. at 564. The argument used in this case is the often-used "slippery slope"
argument, which suggests that the Court must step in to place limits on certain powers or
rights before they are expanded too far. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 601-02
(2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that if the Court invalidates state sodomy laws then the
door is opened to question whether bans against same-sex marriage must also be invalidated);
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 648-49 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (analogizing the issue of
sexual orientation and laws criminalizing sodomy with laws that criminalize polygamy and
suggesting that prohibition of criminal sodomy laws could lead to prohibition of laws
criminalizing polygamy).
60. 514 U.S. at 550.
61. See id.
2007] 1049
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B. United States v. Morrison
Scalia again joined with the majority in Morrison,62 striking down a
provision of the Violence Against Women Act 63 that created a federal
civil remedy for gender-motivated crimes. The majority opinion, again
authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist, found that, much like the causal
connection in Lopez, the conclusion that gender-motivated crimes
"substantially affect interstate commerce" was tenuousi' Additionally,
the Chief Justice implied that the Supreme Court needed to respond to
the expanding interpretation of the Commerce Clause by restricting
congressional power because the federal government was beginning to
usurp all areas of law and threaten state autonomy in traditionally state-
regulated areas.65
The majority emphasizes not only the distinction between economic
and non-economic activities, but also that between national and local
authority.66 Scalia again declined the opportunity to provide an opinion
on the subject and instead joined the majority, indicating that he agreed
with the Commerce Clause analysis as presented and did not feel that
further explanation was required.67
Because Scalia did not provide commentary on either of these
important decisions, and what appeared to be the beginning of a new
trend in Commerce Clause jurisprudence, these cases do not provide a
strong basis for extracting Scalia's Commerce Clause philosophy.
62. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
63. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994).
64. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615.
65. See id.
66. Id. at 613, 615 (stating that a classification of an activity as economic is not a
prerequisite to regulating intrastate activities, but that the case law to date has only regulated
economic activities).
67. The fact that Justice Scalia joined the majority in both of these opinions is not
surprising and follows the trend in Supreme Court decisions in which Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices Scalia and Thomas agreed on the determination of issues and often joined the
opinions of one another. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 607 (2005) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting; opinion joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Thomas, J.); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558 586 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting; opinion joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Thomas, J.);
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 337 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting; opinion joined by
Rehnquist, C.J., and Thomas, J.); see also The Supreme Court, 2003 Term-Nine Justices, Ten
Years: A Statistical Retrospective, 118 HARV. L. REV. 510, 516-18 (2004) (providing statistics
on the Justices' voting patterns from 1994-2003 and determining that during this period on
average Scalia and Rehnquist were aligned in 78% of the decisions, Scalia and Thomas were
aligned in 86.7% of the decisions, and Rehnquist and Thomas were aligned in 79.4% of the
decisions). In addition, Justices Scalia and Thomas voted together as much as 97.7% in a
given year. Id. at 516.
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Deciphering his Commerce Clause jurisprudence is paramount in
determining whether Scalia strayed from his "originalist" approach or if
such an originalist analysis comports with the result reached in Scalia's
Raich6' concurrence.
IV. JUSTICE SCALIA'S JURISPRUDENCE: THE ORIGINALIST APPROACH
The "originalist" approach, as described by Scalia, is the only way to
approach constitutional interpretation to ensure that judges are not
reading their subjective views into the Constitution.6 9  The theory
behind originalism, or as Scalia sometimes refers to it, textualism," is to
"begin with the text, and to give that text the meaning that it bore when
it was adopted by the people."71 Scalia has been known to refer to a
dictionary that was published at the time in which the statute or
constitutional Amendment was enacted to discover the meaning
attributed to the term at that time." Scalia recognizes the Court-created
principle of stare decisis as an exception to his originalist approach.73
This adherence to stare decisis comports with Scalia's claim that the law
must be predictable and that predictability actually restrains judges
because "[i]f the next case should have such different facts that my
political or policy preferences regarding the outcome are quite the
opposite, I will be unable to indulge those preferences ... However,
in a recent opinion, Scalia stated, "I do not myself believe in rigid
",75
adherence to stare decisis in constitutional cases ....
Scalia has also reiterated that his interpretive philosophy does not
include the theory that the Constitution changes with time no matter
how many judges and legislators subscribe to that theory.76 In fact,
Scalia has sharply criticized those who follow the idea of a living
68. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 33 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring).
69. Scalia, supra note 15.
70. SCALIA, supra note 32, at 23.
71. Scalia, supra note 15.
72. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 559 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (reciting the
definition of "enforce" as found in two separate dictionaries published in 1860, the time at
which the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted). Justice Scalia's use of dictionaries for
constitutional interpretation has been criticized by scholars. See, e.g., Ellen P. Aprill, The
Law of the Word: Dictionary Shopping in the Supreme Court, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 275 (1998).
73. SCALIA, supra note 32, at 140; see also Scalia, supra note 16, at 861 ("[Allmost every
originalist would adulterate [originalism] with... stare decisis.").
74. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1179
(1989).
75. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 587 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
76. See Scalia, supra note 15.
2007]
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Constitution, and at a recent Federalist Society gathering stated that
"you would have to be an idiot to believe that." 7 Instead, Scalia places
a premium on the power of the electorate to change laws through the
democratic process, fearing that judicial decision-making deprives the
electorate of the opportunity to democratically shape laws. 8
To fully appreciate Scalia's originalist approach to constitutional
interpretation, it is necessary to consider his jurisprudence in separate
areas of constitutional law-specifically in the areas of equal protection,
due process, and cruel and unusual punishment-with examples of the
application of his interpretive philosophy.
A. Equal Protection Guarantees
Scalia has emphasized throughout his Equal Protection Clause
jurisprudence that this provision of the Constitution should be read as it
was understood when enacted following the Civil War. He has indicated
that the Court has read too many provisions into the Equal Protection
Clause, including the idea that equal protection encompasses
discrimination based on gender and age.79 Additionally, Scalia believes
that "substantive due process ' was fabricated by the Court and
provides judges with the power to inform the public of its "fundamental
liberties" that are actually based upon Justices' subjective beliefs. 8,
This idea that the Equal Protection Clause should be read more
narrowly than the Court's current interpretation is apparent when
considering Scalia's dissenting opinion in United States v. Virginia.2 In
that case, the Court determined that Virginia had violated the Equal
Protection Clause by maintaining Virginia Military Institute ("VMI") as
77. Adam Liptak, Public Comments by Justices Veer Toward the Political, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 19, 2006, at A22.
78. This has been Justice Scalia's greatest criticism of areas such as abortion and cruel
and unusual punishment. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 607 (2005) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 337 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 979 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in
part and dissenting in part).
79. Scalia, supra note 15.
80. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Substantive due process, as opposed to
procedural due process, has been interpreted by the Court to guarantee that individuals will
not be deprived of certain individual liberties. This interpretation has lead to most of the
liberties found in the Bill of Rights being protected against state action, whereas the Bill of
Rights originally only restricted actions by the federal government. See, e.g., Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
81. Scalia, supra note 15.
82. 518 U.S. 515, 566-603 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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an all-male university.83 Additionally, Virginia failed to provide a
comparable alternative for women and had sustained this gender
classification based upon generalities regarding the physical and
psychological differences between men and women. 4
Scalia, the sole dissenter in Virginia,85 concluded that Virginia and
VMI had an interest in maintaining an all-male military institute and
further, that the Constitution remains silent regarding educational
matters generally and single-sex education specifically. 86 Therefore, in
Scalia's view, the Court acted by reading popular opinion into the equal
protection interpretation rather than basing its decision on
constitutional principles and allowing the democratic process to
determine issues regarding education.87
Scalia further emphasized that traditionally, education has been
offered through single-sex institutions rather than coeducational
institutions; 8 thus, Scalia found more support for maintaining single-sex
institutions than coeducational institutions in this country. He reasoned
that VMI should have full power to continue its current practice in
furtherance of this United States educational tradition.89  Scalia
subscribes to the idea that rights and opportunities can be changed, even
if the practice has not been deeply rooted in United States traditions, as
long as it is achieved through the democratic process and not by the
judiciary.' However, Scalia also embraces the idea that the Court can
change the standards and principles that it applies to certain areas of the
law as long as it is moving back towards the more "individual rights
based" era when rational basis scrutiny was applied to nearly all
categories of law.91
This narrow reading of the Equal Protection Clause has been further
expounded upon by Scalia through his commentary. For example,
Scalia has asserted that when enacted, the Equal Protection Clause did
83. Id. at 540.
84. Id. at 540-41.
85. Virginia was decided by a 7-1 vote, as Justice Thomas did not participate in this
decision. Id. at 518 (Ginsburg, J., writing for the majority).
86. Id. at 567 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 570.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 569-70.
90. See id. at 570.
91. See id. at 574-75.
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not apply to women, or otherwise the Nineteenth Amendment 92 would
have been superfluous.93 To apply the Equal Protection Clause to
classes other than race, Scalia believes the Court has essentially
furthered the idea of a "Living Constitution," which he claims confuses
the public and is an undesirable result because the Framers drafted an
unchanging Constitution to protect society from its quickly changing
values. 9
Scalia's interpretation in this area is unsettled. First, he claims that
the Equal Protection Clause should be interpreted only as it was
understood in 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted.9"
He further establishes that the Equal Protection Clause only guarantees
against a denial of equal protection of the laws and does not guarantee
specific rights; he then concludes that what constitutes a violation of
equal protection remains subject to interpretation. 96 The claim that
what constitutes a violation of equal protection is subject to
interpretation does not conform with Scalia's idea that equal protection
should be interpreted as it was meant when this Amendment was
adopted' because an "originalist" would provide the answer by
determining the original meaning of the words when they were adopted
without subjective interpretation.99
B. Due Process and Individual Liberties
According to Scalia, under an originalist theory, individual liberties
consist of those that have been embedded in the "history and tradition"
of the United States.99 He goes even further to note that other Justices
on the Court attempt to create new liberties by resorting to the idea of a
"Living Constitution" and by reading into the Constitution the whims of
society." The plurality opinion in Michael H. v. Gerald D., authored by
Scalia, 1' and Scalia's dissent in Lawrence v. Texas'0 2 express Scalia's
narrow interpretation of individual liberties.
92. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX, §1 (guaranteeing the right to vote to all citizens regardless
of gender).
93. SCALIA, supra note 32, at 47.
94. See id.
95. Id. at 148.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See Scalia, supra note 15.
99. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123 (1989) (Scalia, J., writing for a plurality).
100. SCALIA, supra note 32, at 39.
101. 491 U.S. 110.
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In Michael H., the Court upheld a California statute that established
that if a married woman gives birth to a child while married and
cohabitating with her husband, then the husband is presumed to be the
father of the child. °3 This presumption was upheld against a claim of
the asserted biological father, who attempted to establish paternity, and
who had blood test evidence that demonstrated with strong probability
that he was in fact the biological father.""
Scalia, in the plurality opinion, established that procedural due
process ensures only certain procedural guarantees before an individual
may be deprived of liberty and that under substantive due process only
those liberties that are deeply embedded in tradition deserve protection
as "fundamental liberties."' ' Specifically, Scalia interpreted the liberty
interest in this case narrowly, finding that the question was "whether the
relationship between persons in the situation of Michael and Victoria
[the daughter] ha[d] been treated as a protected family unit under the
historic practices of our society, or whether on any other basis it ha[d]
been accorded special protection. ' 6
Framing the "liberty" interest at stake in this manner inherently
prevented Scalia from concluding that such an interest was fundamental
because, without such technology as blood tests, claims such as this
could not have "traditionally" arisen. Justice Brennan's dissenting
opinion contemplated the broader liberty interest at stake, determining
that there is a fundamental interest in parenthood, generally. This
parenthood interest has been protected through several other Supreme
Court decisions and requires at least the procedural safeguards that
Scalia assures that the Due Process Clause provides.1 7
Reading the liberty interest narrowly does, however, comport with
Scalia's textualist approach because this approach seeks to determine
the understanding of the text at the time it was written. As Scalia
assures, the presumption of marital children was a deeply embedded
tradition that could not easily be overcome, at least at the time the
Fourteenth Amendment was adopted and likely when the Constitution
was adopted."° Furthermore, it certainly would have been rare for such
102. 539 U.S. 558, 586-605 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
103. 491 U.S. at 113.
104. Id. at 114.
105. Id. at 120-22.
106. Id. at 124.
107. Id. at 136, 139-40 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 124-25 (Scalia, J., writing for a plurality).
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a parental situation as in the case of Michael H. to arise, and Scalia
thought that this parental situation was still extraordinary even at the
time the case was decided.1 9 Therefore, he remains true to his textualist
approach in this case by reading this liberty interest narrowly.
In another individual liberty and due process case, Lawrence v.
Texas, Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion and again narrowly defined the
liberty question.11° In Lawrence, the Court struck down a Texas statute
that criminalized homosexual sodomy, determining that individuals had
a liberty interest in making decisions about their personal relationships
and conducting private behavior in their own homes.11'
Scalia, however, did not consider the question to be a privacy issue-
an issue that has gained and continues to receive support within the
Supreme Court and that covers such areas as family decisions,
contraception, abortion, and similar issues."2 Instead, he framed the
issue as a right to engage in homosexual sodomy."3 He supported his
position by emphasizing that statutes criminalizing sodomy have a long
tradition in United States society and were in effect when the
Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and the Fourteenth Amendment were
adopted.' Collectively, these facts helped support the Court's decision
in Bowers v. Hardwick,"' which upheld a statute criminalizing sodomy.
If the issue in Lawrence is framed as a right to engage in homosexual
sodomy, then an originalist approach would deem the statute
unconstitutional because the right is not fundamental or deeply rooted
in society. Alternatively, if one asserts that the right at issue is in fact a
right to privacy or a right to be free from governmental interference in
personal choices regarding relationship matters, it would be difficult to
find that such rights were not deeply rooted in society.
Furthermore, Scalia criticized the majority opinion for failing to
comply with the principle of stare decisis."6 He claims that the Court
applied illogical principles in overruling the controversial Bowers
decision because it based the determination upon the highly contested
109. Id. at 113.
110. 539 U.S. 558, 586 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 567.
112. See generally id. at 564-66; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
113. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 596 (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192-94 (1986)).
115. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558.
116. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 587 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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nature of the issue within society.11 7 Instead, he argues that in this
instance, the Court must maintain its original position because the
traditions of criminalizing sodomy are deeply rooted in society."8 In the
context of abortion, however, a traditionally more "liberal" area, Scalia
endorses refraining from applying stare decisis and encourages the
Court to reconsider its finding of a fundamental liberty. " 9
It is unclear whether Scalia's position on the application of stare
decisis in these two contexts can be reconciled with his interpretive
theory of originalism because this principle appears to apply in the
context of homosexual sodomy, but not in the case of abortion. Scalia
acknowledges that stare decisis is a way for originalists to continue to
change and shape the law through individual preferences, but claims
that through self-restraint, it should not be utilized in this manner. ° It
remains unclear whether Scalia would maintain such self-restraint in his
application of the principle of stare decisis if given the opportunity to
review similar questions.
C. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
In another context, that of the Eighth Amendment, 121 Scalia has
offered an originalist approach to determining what constitutes "cruel
and unusual" punishment. Scalia concluded that to interpret this
amendment correctly, the Court must determine the understanding of
that phrase at the time in which it was adopted by the Framers. 122 This
interpretive technique has proven contradictory for Scalia because he
has applied, and continues to apply, the Court's interpretation of cruel
and unusual punishment, which requires a search into society's
"evolving standards of decency." 123
Despite Scalia's textualist approach, which requires an adherence to
the text of the Constitution and the original understanding of its words,
he has continually applied the Court's "evolving standards of decency"
117. See id.
118. See id. at 596.
119. See id. at 587-91.
120. See SCALIA, supra note 32, at 140.
121. U.S. CONST. amend VIII.
122. Scalia, supra note 16, at 864 (noting that he may be a "faint-hearted originalist"
because if an issue of public flogging was used as a method of punishment he could not
uphold it).
123. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 608 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Atkins
v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 341 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S.
361, 369 (1989) (Scalia, J., writing for a plurality).
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formulation of the Eighth Amendment to modern cases." Scalia does
cite disapproval of this standard, but he did not espouse contention with
it until he drafted a dissenting opinion in the recent case of Roper v.
Simmons.'2' In that case, the Court found that the execution of criminal
defendants under the age of majority constituted cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
12 6
In more recent Supreme Court decisions, the Court has reiterated
that it will consider what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment
under the Eighth Amendment in light of the "evolving standards of
decency" of society. 2 7 This standard requires a searching determination
of the new values of a dynamic electorate and appears to inherently
contradict Scalia's theory of interpretation, which requires adherence to
the original understanding of the phrase "cruel and unusual." Scalia's
application of this evolving standard is in direct opposition to his
originalist philosophy of constitutional interpretation.
Scalia, however, continues to apply the standard of an evolving
understanding of the terms "cruel" and "unusual" in capital punishment
cases. For example, in the case of Stanford v. Kentucky,'28 Scalia drafted
the plurality opinion, which determined that execution of criminal
defendants over the age of sixteen, but under the age of eighteen, did
not constitute cruel and unusual punishment and thus was not in
violation of the Eighth Amendment. 
129
In this plurality opinion, Scalia acknowledged that the Court has
departed from the original understanding of the phrase "cruel and
unusual punishment" by applying an "'evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society' standard. " ° He contends
that the Court has included appropriate safeguards upon this modifiable
interpretation by allowing only those punishments that have gained
"national consensus" to apply.13' Scalia admits that under an original
reading of cruel and unusual punishment, imposition of capital
punishment on criminal defendants under the age of majority would
124. See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 607; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 341; Stanford, 492 U.S. 361.
125. 543 U.S. at 607-08 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
126. Id. at 575.
127. See, e.g., id. at 561; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 341; Stanford, 492 U.S. at 369; Thompson v.
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 821 (1988); McKlesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 300 (1987).
128. Stanford, 492 U.S. 361 (Scalia, J., writing for a plurality).
129. Id. at 380.
130. Id. at 369 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion)).
131. Id. at 370-71.
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surely not violate this standard because capital punishment theoretically
could have applied to defendants as young as the age of seven."'
Scalia then goes on to apply the modern standard to determine if the
petitioner's claim can be maintained. He ultimately concludes that the
national consensus does not consider application of capital punishment
to defendants under the age of eighteen, but over the age of sixteen, to
constitute cruel and unusual punishment.'33  In support of this
conclusion, Scalia determines that only fifteen of the thirty-seven states
that have capital punishment have outlawed it for crimes committed by
defendants sixteen years old or younger, and only twelve of those states
have laws prohibiting the application of capital punishment to
seventeen-year old defendants." Therefore, there was not enough
evidence to demonstrate the degree of national consensus required to
rule that capital punishment for defendants under the age of eighteen is
cruel and unusual punishment.135
In another Eighth Amendment case, Scalia concluded that the
prevailing national consensus did not consider that the imposition of
capital punishment upon mentally retarded defendants constituted cruel
and unusual punishment. Scalia began his dissenting opinion in this
case, Atkins v. Virginia,3 6 by stating that the Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence of the Court has no support in the actual text of the
Constitution. '37 However, Scalia does address the issue presented by
considering the national consensus standard, even though he believes
this analysis has no textual support. 3 '
Scalia's failure to apply the principles of textualism in this context is
wrought with several problems. First, extracting a national consensus
view for a term found within the Constitution certainly does not find
support within the text of the Constitution itself. As Scalia has stated,
when the Constitution remains silent on an issue, the Court should not
entertain the issue. 3 9 Furthermore, by accepting and applying this
132. Id. at 368.
133. Id. at 370-71, 380.
134. Id. at 370-71.
135. See id.
136. 536 U.S. 304, 337 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
137. Id. Another example where Scalia interpreted a provision that has no basis in the
text of the Constitution occurs in Printz v. United States, where Scalia admitted that "there is
no constitutional text speaking to this precise question," but proceeded to interpret whether
the federal government can compel state officers to participate in the administration of
federal programs. 521 U.S. 898, 905 (1997).
138. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 341-44.
139. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 567 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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standard of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, Scalia is either
attempting to adhere to his stated philosophy by applying stare decisis
as an exception to the textualist approach,'" or he has abandoned the
principles of textualism in this context altogether.
If Scalia is adhering to the exception to originalism, that of stare
decisis, by applying the "evolving standards" interpretation, there is a
further problem. Either Scalia is applying stare decisis to uphold
previous decisions, or he is applying stare decisis on the grounds of the
method of interpretation laid out by a previous Court. In this particular
context, he must be applying stare decisis to adhere to the interpretive
philosophy that has been reiterated in other contexts because if he
relied on stare decisis to uphold individual decisions, there would be a
conflict between national consensus and previous Court rulings. '
Scalia has found that the Court has departed from its philosophy by
considering something less than a national consensus to strike down
laws. Under Scalia's analysis, only the states that have capital
punishment laws should be considered in this national consensus. In
Roper v. Simmons,'42 Scalia expounded upon this idea of only applying
the consensus of states that continue to implement capital punishment in
his determination of national consensus. Scalia filed a dissenting
opinion in Roper, in which he first criticized the Court for relying upon
the "evolving standards of decency" analysis'43 and then went on to
determine that the fact "[t]hat 12 states favor no executions says
something about consensus against the death penalty, but nothing-
absolutely nothing-about consensus that offenders under 18 deserve
special immunity from such a penalty."'"
This distinction is misplaced, especially when the goal appears to be
to extract the views of an entire nation of people. The views of those in
states that do not implement capital punishment certainly should be
considered in the national consensus, or they would effectively be
removed from participation in shaping national views. This result
appears "absurd," even though Scalia refuses to tolerate absurd
140. See SCALIA, supra note 32, at 140.
141. See, e.g., Atkins, 536 U.S. at 337 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492
U.S. 361 (1989) (Scalia, J., writing for a plurality).
142. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
143. Id. at 608 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that the Court relies upon the evolving
standards of decency analysis, which is "in accordance with our modern (though in my view
mistaken) jurisprudence").
144. Id. at 611.
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constructions of constitutional provisions."5 Actually, the states that
outlaw capital punishment altogether indicate that capital punishment
should not be imposed for any crime on anyone, which includes those
under the age of eighteen. If the democratic process is the correct way
to determine these matters (an idea to which Scalia claims that he
ascribes),'46 then the democratic process must speak in national terms
when a national consensus is sought.
Scalia's cruel and unusual punishment jurisprudence leaves much
unanswered when attempting to decipher how an originalist approach in
this context would proceed. He claims to adhere to the original
meaning of the terms "cruel and unusual" at the time the Bill of Rights
was adopted. 14 7 However, Scalia has applied the "evolving standards of
decency" analysis to cases, including within a plurality opinion that he
authored.' "  Although Scalia expresses disdain for this changing
interpretation of the Constitution, 149 he refuses to simply apply his
originalist standard and instead continues to consider the cases under
the changing standard. 5 ' One is left to assume that Scalia has faltered in
his adherence to his stated approach or that he is somehow complying
with the exception to originalism, stare decisis. However, applying stare
decisis does not actually comply with Scalia's interpretive philosophy
because he either upholds previous decisions that were not decided
using he textualist approach or upholds and applies a non-textualist
interpretation of the law in new cases.
V. APPLICATION OF THE ORIGINALIST APPROACH TO SCALIA'S
CONCURRING OPINION IN GONZALES V. RAICH
Whether Scalia conformed to his method of interpretation when he
drafted his concurring opinion in Gonzales v. Raich' remains
unanswered. In considering Commerce Clause jurisprudence, it is
145. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonesca, 480 U.S. 421, 452 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(stating that if the language of a statute is clear, then the court must give the language its plain
meaning unless it is patently absurd); SCALIA, supra note 32, at 132.
146. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 603 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
147. See SCALIA, supra note 32, at 146.
148. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 (1989) (Scalia, J., writing for a
plurality).
149. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 607-08 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (finding
that the Court did not rely on the "original meaning of the Eighth Amendment, but to 'the
evolving standards of decency"' (citation omitted)).
150. Id. at 608-10.
151. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
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important to note that the initial conception of the Constitution was that
the powers of the federal government were to be few and defined.'52
This view has been reiterated throughout Supreme Court jurisprudence.
In the early cases addressing Congress's Commerce Clause power, the
Supreme Court interpreted Congress's power narrowly, especially if it
related to economic matters or police powers. "3
For example, in the early Civil Rights Cases, the government did not
defend the passage of a broad law that regulated individual actors'
conduct under a Commerce Clause theory because Congress's power
under this Clause had not been contemplated for use in this manner."'
Justice Marshall interpreted Congress's power under the Commerce
Clause more broadly in Gibbons v. Ogden, emphasizing that Congress
had the power to regulate waters, even if they would partially affect only
intrastate matters.'55 Yet, applying this broader interpretation leaves
limits upon Congress's power with respect to non-commercial
activities.116 Even after Justice Marshall drafted this decision, it was not
relied upon by Congress or the Supreme Court in the cases that
followed.
The modern interpretation of congressional Commerce Clause
power did not emerge until 1937. In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp.,'5 7 the first case to provide such a broad interpretation of
Congress's Commerce Clause power, the majority established the three
categories under which Congress can regulate interstate commerce,
58
which are still applied today. Due to the date of this decision, it cannot
be asserted that this broad interpretation of Commerce Clause power
was contemplated as the original understanding when the Constitution
was adopted. 5 9
Therefore, it seems that if Scalia were to adhere to the meaning of
the Constitution's text when it was written, he would follow a relatively
152. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
153. See, e.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
154. See 109 U.S. 3 (1883). It is important to note that Congress passed similar
legislation in the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which was upheld by the Court under Congress's
Commerce Clause power. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241
(1964); 42 U.S.C. § 2000(a) (1964).
155. See 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
156. See id.
157. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
158. See id.
159. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 585-88 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (providing an overview of the interpretation of the Commerce Clause as it was
meant when enacted by the Framers).
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narrow interpretation of commerce power as the early cases would
indicate."6 This narrow interpretation seems to conform to his decision
to join the majority in the cases of Lopez16 and Morrison,62 where in
both cases the Court struck down statutes enacted under Congress's
Commerce Clause power as overly broad and thus in violation of the
Constitution. The majority in those cases did not necessarily define the
Commerce Clause narrowly; however, the majority did determine that a
limitation of the Commerce Clause power was necessary in order to
protect federalism. 1
63
The interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause, on the other
hand, has historically been broad. The first case to address the
Necessary and Proper Clause was McCulloch v. Maryland; 6 however,
this case was not decided until nearly thirty years after the Constitution
had been adopted, so whether this decision can truly offer an
understanding of the original meaning of this Clause seems unlikely
under Scalia's originalist standards.'65 Nevertheless, for the purpose of
its argument, this Note shall assume that McCulloch" does provide the
original understanding of the Necessary and Proper Clause at the time it
was adopted.
In McCulloch,6 7 the majority opinion interpreted congressional
powers broadly, but it also gave the term "necessary" an expansive
definition by determining that Congress was not limited by those actions
that are "absolutely indispensable" to carrying out its powers, but rather
that "necessary," in this context, included all actions that are "suitable"
to its purpose. 16' Therefore, the majority granted Congress wide latitude
in enacting laws to carry out its other constitutional powers.
Assuming that McCulloch169 provides insight into the original
understanding of this Clause, Scalia's extremely broad reading of the
Necessary and Proper Clause in his Raich'70 concurrence does comply
160. See id.; see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (finding that the Court's application of the "substantial effects" test is
inconsistent with the original interpretation of the Commerce Clause).
161. 514 U.S. 549.
162. 529 U.S. 598.
163. See id. at 614-16; 514 U.S. at 564-65.
164. See 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
165. See generally Scalia, supra note 16, at 861-62.
166. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316.
167. Id.
168. See id.
169. Id.
170. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
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with his originalist interpretation of this Clause. By determining that
Congress is not constrained by the powers that are explicitly
enumerated within the Constitution, Scalia adheres to the interpretation
that Congress may implement all "suitable" means to carry out its
laws. ''
However, another aspect of Scalia's broad interpretation of the
Necessary and Proper Clause contradicts his originalist approach.
Specifically, the Court's reliance upon a broader reading of the term
"necessary," and not the definition that would have been found in a
dictionary of that time, does not comport with Scalia's reliance upon the
ordinary meaning of words at the time in which they were adopted.
72
The majority opinion in McCulloch17 explicitly rejected the ordinary
meaning of the term necessary and instead determined that it should be
interpreted to include more than the powers that are "indispensable to
the existence of a granted power."'
7
Scalia has also rejected reliance upon the Necessary and Proper
Clause when that reliance would violate principles of federalism. 5 In
Printz v. United States, Scalia, writing for the majority, rejected the
argument that Congress could require state officers to conduct
background checks for the sale of handguns through the Commerce
Clause, as applied by the Necessary and Proper Clause.176 In fact, Scalia
determined that if Congress has passed a law that infringes upon state
sovereignty, then it is not a law that is "proper" to carry into execution
Congress's commerce power. 177 Scalia went even further to state that
"'[e]ven where Congress has the authority under the Constitution to
pass laws requiring or prohibiting certain acts, it lacks the power directly
to compel the States to require or prohibit those acts .... it does not
authorize Congress to regulate state governments' regulation of
interstate commerce.",
178
171. See id. at 39.
172. See generally SCALIA, supra note 32; Scalia, supra note 16; Aprill, supra note 72
(criticizing Justice Scalia's reliance upon different dictionary definitions of words and also his
failure to rely upon definitions when they do not comport with his preferred interpretation);
Thomas W. Merrill, The Making of the Second Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary Analysis, 47
ST. Louis U. L.J. 569, 604-20 (2003) (arguing that Scalia has acted strategically while on the
bench to pursue his own goals of effectuating changes within the Court's jurisprudence).
173. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
174. Id. at 325.
175. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923 (1997).
176. See generally 521 U.S. 898.
177. See id. at 932.
178. Id. at 924 (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992)).
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Such a federalism argument can be and was made in Raich,'79 finding
that allowing the federal government to act in this context prevents
states from making individual decisions regarding its citizens' health and
welfare. 180  Furthermore, the regulation in Raich did just what Scalia
claimed the Necessary and Proper Clause could not do-regulate an
individual state's regulation of interstate commerce by prohibiting states
from individually regulating certain markets.
Despite his broad interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause
in Raich, Scalia did not find it suitable for consideration in the cases of
Lopez 8' or Morrison.' Interestingly, Scalia did not join any of the
dissenting opinions in these cases. Most of these dissents found that if
the Court was to remain consistent with the broad interpretation of the
Commerce Clause, which requires a broad formulation of the Necessary
and Proper Clause because it is this Clause that allows Congress to
regulate activities that "substantially affect" interstate commerce,'83 then
the Court must find that Congress had the power to regulate the
activities in both of these cases.184
Additionally, Scalia refrained from filing a concurring opinion or
from joining one of the concurring opinions in either of these cases. 85
This abstention is notable for two reasons. First, Justice Thomas's
concurrence in Lopez' laid out factors demonstrating that the
Commerce Clause was initially read with a narrow interpretation and
that the Commerce Clause was only understood to mean "selling,
buying, and bartering."'" Justice Thomas offered a similar concurrence
in Morrison, ' reiterating that the Court has strayed far from the
original understanding of the Commerce Clause. 189  Justice Thomas
seems to offer the "textualist" approach to the interpretation of the
Commerce Clause in these opinions; yet, Scalia does not join him in this
interpretation. Second, Justices Scalia and Thomas often join one
179. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
180. Id. at 74 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
181. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
182. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
183. See, e.g., Raich, 545 U.S. 1; Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S.
528, 585-86 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
184. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 628 (Souter, J., dissenting); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 603-04
(Souter, J., dissenting).
185. See Morrison, 529 U.S. 598; Lopez, 514 U.S. 549.
186. 514 U.S. 549.
187. Id. at 585-86 (Thomas, J., concurring).
188. 529 U.S. 598.
189. Id. at 627 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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another's opinions due to their similar approaches to constitutionalinterpretation. 190
The reason for this discrepancy can only mean that Scalia has
applied the exception to the originalist approach by adhering to stare
decisis.191 This appears to be a plausible explanation for Scalia's broad
interpretation of the Commerce Clause, because that has been the trend
of the modern Court, and he would be following precedent by doing so.
However, this again is at odds with his failure to follow this broad
interpretation in the cases of Lopez' and Morrison.93  It is also
important to consider that all of the Justices that signed on to the
majority opinion in Raich,194 with the exception of Justice Kennedy, also
filed dissenting opinions in Lopez'95 and Morrison.96 This supports the
determination that the Justices that adhere to a strict construction of the
Commerce power find that Congress did not have the power to regulate
in areas that were addressed in Raich,197 Morrison,198 or Lopez.' 99
Alternatively, those Justices that follow a broad interpretation of the
Commerce power found that Congress had authority to regulate in all
three of these areas.'
The discrepancy within his approach suggests that Scalia is not
always committed to one of two theories in his Commerce Clause
jurisprudence, namely: (1) following his adherence to an original
understanding of the terms as they were enacted under a textualist
approach or (2) accepting a broad interpretation of congressional power
under the Commerce Clause as demanded by stare decisis.
Instead, Scalia will utilize a stricter adherence to a textualist
approach when it conforms to his subjective beliefs in other areas, such
as his philosophy regarding firearm regulation, which includes a broad
interpretation of the Second Amendment. 20' Alternatively, when the
matter at hand concerns the individual use and consumption of
190. See supra note 67.
191. SCALIA, supra note 32, at 140.
192. 514 U.S. 549.
193. 529 U.S. 598.
194. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
195. 514 U.S. 549.
196. 529 U.S. 598. See generally Raich, 545 U.S. 1; Lopez, 514 U.S. 549.
197. Raich, 545 U.S. 1.
198. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598.
199. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549.
200. See Raich, 545 U.S. 1; Morrison, 529 U.S. 598; Lopez, 514 U.S. 549.
201. SCALIA, supra note 32, at 136-37 n.13.
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medicinal marijuana, Scalia provides an extremely broad reading of the
Necessary and Proper Clause to ensure that Congress may regulate all
activities that relate to its broader controlled substance regulations."
The question remains as to which theory Scalia will apply when the
Supreme Court has the next occasion to address congressional
Commerce Clause authority. The answer may not be found in his
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, but rather rests upon Scalia's beliefs
and interpretation of the areas of law affected by the law being
considered.
VI. CONCLUSION
Scalia's Raich concurrence rests upon a broad interpretation of
Congress's Commerce Clause power by establishing that this power is
derived from the Necessary and Proper Clause.2"3 This interpretation
allows for an even broader grant of congressional power than through
the Commerce power alone. Although Scalia is known for his
"textualist" approach to constitutional interpretation, which requires
reading the Constitution as it was understood at the time in which it was
written,3'  he departs from his jurisprudence by finding broad
congressional power to regulate the intrastate growth and consumption
of marijuana for medicinal use.25
By examining his constitutional interpretation in other areas of the
law, including the Equal Protection Clause, individual rights, and cruel
and unusual punishment, it becomes apparent that his textualist
interpretation falters in other areas as well. Even though Scalia does
establish an exception to textualism, stare decisis,2°6 he does not apply
this principle consistently either. Rather, Scalia has demonstrated a
selective application of this principle, while admitting that through the
abuse of this principle Justices are able to shape laws to their individual
preferences.0' Self-restraint of this application is the only safeguard
against judicially made law.
Instead of exercising the self-restraint necessary to prevent such an
application, Scalia appears to apply stare decisis when it conforms to his
views on constitutional principles in other areas of the law and
202. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 33-35 (Scalia, J., concurring).
203. Id. at 34.
204. SCALIA, supra note 32, at 23-25.
205. Raich, 545 U.S. 33-34 (Scalia, J., concurring).
206. SCALIA, supra note 32, at 139-40.
207. See id.
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refraining from, or encouraging the Court to refrain from, applying this
principle in other contexts.
To reconcile Scalia's broad interpretation of Congress's Commerce
Clause power in Raich with his otherwise limited view of congressional
power and reliance upon democratically elected government to shape
the laws, the focus should be on what the law being enacted regulates
and how it relates to other constitutional powers and social views, rather
than on the principles of his textualist approach.
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